University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Economics Department

7-1993

Omitted-Ability Bias and the Increase in the Return to Schooling
McKinley L. Blackburn
University of South Carolina - Columbia, BLACKBRN@MOORE.SC.EDU

David Neumark
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/econ_facpub
Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons

Publication Info
Published in Journal of Labor Economics, Volume 11, Issue 3, 1993, pages 521-544.
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jlaboreconomics
© 1993 by University of Chicago Press

This Article is brought to you by the Economics Department at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Omitted-Ability Bias and the
Increase in the Return to Schooling
McKinley L. Blackburn, Umverslty of South Carolma
David N eumark, Umverszty of Pennsylvama and
N atlOnal Bureau of EconomIc Research

Over the 1980s, there were sharp increases in the return to schooling
estimated with conventional wage regressions. We explore whether
the relationship between ability and schooling changed over this period
in ways that would have increased the schooling coefficient in these
regressions. Our empirical results reject the hypothesis that an increase
in the bias of the schooling coefficient, due to a change in the relatIOnship between ability and schoolmg, has contributed to observed
increases in the return to schooling. We also find that the increase in
the schoolmg return has occurred for workers with relatively high
levels of academic ability.
I. Introduction
In the 1980s, the United States experienced considerable changes m the
structure of wages paid to different demographic and educational groups.
The most notable of these changes is a large increase in wage differences
of white males at different educational levels, as the wages of more-educated
workers increased relative to their less-educated counterparts. For instance,
among white males between the ages of 25 and 34 in 1979, college graduates
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at the UniversIty of PennsylvanIa, the UniversIty of Maryland, and Columbia UnIversity for helpful comments. Sadiq Currimbhoy provided excellent research assistance.
[Journal of Labor EconomIcs, 1993,vol II,no 3]
© 1993 by The University of Chicago All nghts reserved
0734-306X/93/II03-0003$01.50

521

Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.

522

Blackburn/Neumark

earned roughly 15% more than workers who had only completed high
school; among 25-34-year-olds in 1987, college graduates earned 33% more
than high-school graduates.! Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990/91)
show that wage differences associated with education also increased for
white females, while Katz and Revenga (1989) also point to Increases in
the 1980s in wage differences associated with the level of labor market
experience of white males.
Several studies have attempted to explain why education-related wage
differentials increased In the 1980s. Perhaps the most commonly offered
explanations have been associated with changes in the relative demand for
workers at different educational levels. For example, it has been suggested
that changes in international trade patterns have shifted relative labor demand curves in favor of the more educated. An associated explanation
singles out shifts in the industrial structure of the economy toward servlceoriented production as the important factor. However, the available evidence suggests that these changes have at most played a minor role In the
changes in earnings differentials. There is also evidence that changes in
the supply of workers at different educational levels have contributed to
the changes in earnings differentials, especially for younger white males,
though the magnitude of this effect is sensitive to assumptions about the
substitutability between more and less educated workers. An alternative
explanation (discussed in Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman [1990)) is that
there are changes in the average level of productive ability of workers in
different educational classes. 2
There are several economic theories that suggest there might be a relationship between a worker's inherent ability (i.e., ability not affected by
acquisition of schoolIng) and his level of schooling. In the following section,
we discuss two such theories-a signaling model and a human-capital
model. We also argue that it is possible that changes over time in the
schooling-ability relationship have played a role in Increasing the observed
return to schooling. In particular, we suggest that an increase In the correlation between ability and schooling among cohorts entering the labor
market could have caused an increase in the return to education without
a corresponding increase In the "true" effect of schooling on wages. Alternatively, an Increase in the price of ability could also lead to a SpUrIOUS
increase in the estimated return to schooling. Since most empirical studies
of the increase in the return to schooling do not attempt to control for the

I These statistIcs are taken from table 1 of Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman
(1990). Similar findings are reported m, e.g., Katz and Revenga (1989).
2 Kosters (1991, p. 16) suggests that "given the growmg fractIon of young people
completmg at least some college, those completing only high school might not be
as able as ear Iter generatIons of students."
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effect of unobserved ability on wages, estimates of the increase in schoollllg
returns could reflect a change in the schooling-ability relationship.
At the outset, we want to emphasize that changes in the relationshlp
between ability and schooling can constitute only a partial explanation of
recent changes in education-earnings differentials. This follows from the
fact that these differentials have increased for older as well as younger
workers, while changes in the ability-schooling relationship are most directly related to changes in the return to schooling for cohorts of workers
entering the labor market. However, studies of recent changes in educationearnings differentials have generally found that increases III these differentials have been considerably larger among cohorts of workers Just entering the labor market than among all prime-age workers. For example,
Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990) report that the increase in the
college /high-school differential from 1979 to 1987 for 25-34-year-olds
was almost double the increase observed for the complete sample of 2564-year-olds. Katz and Murphy (1992) report a similar difference when
comparing workers with 1-5 years of experience to workers at all experience levels. It is this additional increase in educational returns for the
youngest workers (approxlmately half of the total increase) that we consider
potentially explainable by changes in the schooling-abllity relationship.3
But is it possible that the schooling-ability relationship could have
changed sufficiently over an 8-year period so as to cause such a large
increase in the observed return to education? This is in essence an empirical
question, though there is some eVldence suggesting that ability distributions
(as reflected in test scores), as well as the ability-schooling relations hlp,
should not be thought of as stable over time. For one, Bishop (1989)
reports a large decline in the average score on basic-skills tests administered
to students in Iowa (and similar tests in other states) that he argues is
partially responsible for the fall in the rate of productivity growth. More
important, Taubman and Wales (1972) present eVldence from several studies that suggest that the difference III average test scores between students
who contillue their education after completing high school and those who
do not Illcreased almost fivefold from 1925 to 1960. Whlle we are not
aware of any evidence on changes in the relationship between test scores
and schooling among cohorts entering the labor market in the 1980s (prior
to this study), past evidence suggests that the possibility of such changes
deserves attentlOn.
3 Pnor research has suggested that the larger Increase in dIfferentials for younger
workers is due to the fact that supply changes have been more rapId for this group
than for prIme-age workers as a whole. However, estimates of the Importance of
this explanation depend on assumptions about the substItutability between college
and high-school workers (see Katz and Murphy 1992) Research emphaSIzing this
explanation has also generally Ignored substitution possibIlItIes between younger
and older workers of the same education level.
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The empirical work in th1s article uses a sample of young wh1te males
from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) Youth Cohort. We use data
on these mdividuals to estimate wage equations that attempt to control
for (among other things) the effect of both schooling and "unobserved
ability" on wages. The models we estimate take advantage of scores on
several tests measuring academic (or cognitive) and technical ability that
are ava1lable in the Youth Cohort data. These test scores are used as (potentially error-prone) measures of abilIty in wage equations. We also consider econometric problems that arise from the potential endogeneity of
schooling choices with respect to wages for young workers.
Our empirical findings provide little or no support for the idea that
changes in the relationship between ability and schooling in the 1980s are
responsible for the increase in education-related earnings d1fferentials. In
fact, our results suggest that the correlation between abIlity and schooling
fell over this period. However, we do find evidence that the increase in
earnings d1fferentials has occurred primarily for workers with higher academic ability.
II. Theoretical Discussion of the
Ability-Schooling Relationship
In this section, we consider the effect that the relationship between
omitted ability and schooling has on empirical estimates of the relationship
between education and earlllngs and how changes m the abilIty-schooling
relationship may change the estimated relatlonship between education and
earnings. We assume a model for earnings that follows the form
(1)
where w is the log of the wage, S is an educatlon variable, A is an ability
variable, and E is an error term distributed independently of S and A.4
Since A 1S not observed in the data sets used in recent studies of changes
in the return to schooling, these studies have used the slmple-regression
coefficient bws as an estimate for ~I (1.e., they estimate [1] omitting ability
from the regression). This is a biased estimate, if A and S are correlated.
In this sectlon, we discuss two kmds of models that suggest a positive
relationship between ability and schooling: the slgnaling model and a variant of the usual human capital model.
In slmple signaling models, h1gh-ability workers obtain more schooling
than low-ability workers because schooling provides a signal to employers
that they have high levels of ability (e.g., see Spence 1973). In a signaling
4 The wage equatIon can be thought of as the partial relation of W w1th Sand
A, the correlatIon of other vanables WIth w, S, and A havtng been removed.
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model in which ability is a continuous variable, but the schooling signal
is dichotomous (such as college versus no college), changes in the percentage of workers who obtain schooling should be associated with changes
m the wage differential between educated and noneducated workers since
the expected level of abilIty for educated and noneducated workers WIll
be affected. 5 In particular, an increase m the percentage of workers who
obtain the schooling signal is likely to be associated with a decline in the
wage differential (if educated workers remam a minority of workers after
this mcrease).
Among 25-64-year-olds, the percentage of men who are college graduates
increased from 1979 to 1987, while the wage dIfferential between college
graduates and all other workers also mcreased. Since college graduates
remained a minority of workers, an increase in this wage differential is the
opposIte of what the signaling model would predIct. With more than two
levels of schooling, however, simple predictions are not possible. In Blackburn and N eumark (1991), we performed simulations of the effects that
observed changes in the percentages of workers in a four-way education
classification would be expected to have on wage differentials. Though the
percentage of workers who were college graduates did fall from 1979 to
1987 among 25-34-year-olds, these simulations suggested that a signaling
model would imply associated changes in wage differentials that would
be very small, and much smaller than the actual changes in observed wage
differentials. Thus, it appears that a signaling model cannot explam the
increased return to schooling in the 1980s as a consequence of a change
in the ability-schooling relatIonship.
A positive correlation between schooling and abtlity is also suggested
by the human capItal model of Becker (1975). In this model, abtlity increases the marginal benefit to an mdividual of acquiring schooling, while
"opportunity" reflects individual differences that lower the marginal cost
of schooling. Unless there is a sufficiently large negative correlation between
ability and opportUnIty, the model predicts that those workers who choose
more schooling wtll also tend to have hIgher levels of ability. Failure to
control for ability in a wage regreSSIOn should result in upward-biased
estimates of the return to schoolmg. 6
The Becker model can be used to consIder the effect that changes in the
distrIbution of ability and opportunIty would have on the bias in the
schooling coeffiCIent estimates from wage regressions that omitted ability.

5 The model assumes that the mean and variance of the abIlIty dIstnbution IS
stable over tIme. The model is presented In Blackburn and Neumark (1991)
6 In thIS model, a worker's level of opportUnIty does affect theIr choice of schoolIng but does not otherWIse affect the wage they expect to receive. Therefore, omIssion
of measures of opportunIty In the wage regressIOn does not lead to addltJonal bIas
In the schooling coeffiCIent estimate.
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For instance, increases in the variance of ability, or in the size of the covariance between ability and opportunity, should increase this omittedability bias. Likewise, decreases in the variation in opportunity across individuals would also increase this bias. 7 Smce we know little about how
ability I opportunity distributions have been changing in recent years, It is
difficult to speculate on whether changes in this bias are likely. However,
these results suggest that attempting to control for ability in wage regression
estimates of the schooling-return increase is important. In the following
section, we estimate wage models that use test scores as potential indicators
of ability usually not captured in standard wage regressions. With these
estimates, we can explore whether omission of ability has been important
to the large increase in education-earnings differentials among young male
workers.

III. Empirical Analysis
A. Data
The data we use come from the National Longitudinal Survey Youth
(NLSY) Cohort. This cohort was first surveyed in 1979, when the respondents were between the ages of 14 and 22. They have been reinterviewed each year smce 1979; we use data through the 1987 interview. The
information extracted for each year includes wages on the current Job,
schooling status, labor market activity over the previous year, and industry,
occupation, and union coverage on the current job. The 1979 interview
also collected several variables associated with the famlly background of
the respondent, which we use in our empirical analysis.
Most importantly, the data set includes scores of each respondent on
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) tests. Ten test
scores are available, for a variety of cognitive and mechanical aptitudes.
The test areas are general science, arithmetic reasoning, mathematics
knowledge, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, mechanical
comprehension, numerical operations, electronic mformatlon, auto and
shop informatlOn, and coding speed. The ASVAB tests were administered
to all survey respondents between the 1979 and 1980 surveys, with a 94%
completion rate. The availability of these test scores, along with the time
period over which the data were collected, make the NLSY a useful data
set for studying changes in education-related earnings differentials for
young males in the early 1980s and whether shifts in the ablllty-schooling
relationship underlie these changes. 8
These results are demonstrated m Blackburn and N eumark ( 1991 )
The NLSY has also not suffered from sample attrition to the same degree as
earlier longitudmal labor-market surveys; by 1987, roughly 90% of the origmal
cohort was still respondmg to interview requests.
7

8
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The NLSY data could be used in a vanety of ways to measure earnings
differentials for young workers. One possibility is to estimate wage equations for each year from 1979 to 1987, using any respondent in the year
who was working and was not in school. 9 One problem with this type of
analysIs is that the sample in the later years will be increasingly made up
of workers more established in their labor market positions; learning models
suggest that schooling may become less important for wages, and abilIty
more important, as workers accumulate experience, 10 so that this analysis
could confuse age (actually, experience) effects in the return to schooling
with the desired period effects. To minimize this problem, we instead
construct our sample so that we use only one wage for each respondent;
the wage we choose IS the first wage available after the respondent has
completed his schooling (i.e., the respondent does not return to school by
the 1987 wave of the survey). With this sample, we also capture workers
for whom the Increase in the return to schoolIng has been sharpest. The
restriction to using only one wage per respondent makes it impractical to
try to carry out an analysIs of bias in schooling coefficients in regressions
estimated separately for each year from 1979 to 1987, so we allow our
schoolIng coefficients to vary along a linear tIme trend over the 1979-87
penod. 11
Sample means and standard deviations for many of the vanables used
in our wage-equation estimation are presented in the first column of table
1. The average age of our sample of workers on their first postschooling
job is fairly young, though the amount of labor-market experience (i.e.,
hours worked in year-equivalent units) shows that on average our respondents had worked over 2 years before they enter the sample. (Much
of this experience may have been obtaIned in jobs held while in school.)
The educational-attaInment statistics for our sample show slightly lower
average education levels than other estimates for this cohort, probably
because some of the eventually more-educated members of this cohort are
still in school in 1987.
In column 2 of table 1, we report coefficient estimates from an individuallevel regression of some of the variables on a constant and a time trend.
These estimates show how the composition of the sample changes as we
9 Bishop (1991) uses a restricted version of this setup, in which coefficients In
wage equatIOns are allowed to vary along a linear trend over the sample period.
Also, he does not restnct the sample to indIVIduals who are out of school.
10 See, e.g., Hams and Holmstrom (1982) and Farber and GIbbons (1990). Indeed,
Farber and GIbbons denve a further restnctIon that returns to abIlity will Increase
wIth expenence, while returns to schooling wIll remain constant.
11 We restrict the analysis to white males, for whom we have 2,451 observations.
We exclude the self-employed, farm laborers, and respondents reporting a wage
lower than one-half of the federal minimum wage prevaIling in the year from
which the observation IS drawn.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for First Postschooling
Labor Market Observation
Log wage
Years of education
High school graduate (12 years)
College graduate (16 years)
Expenencet
Age
Marned, spouse present
Urban
UnIOn
Number of observatIOns
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

Test scores (age-neutral):j:
Academic test§
Technical testll
ComputatIOnal test
Nonacademic test-technical
+ computational

NOTE

-Standard deviations are reported

In

Mean

Trend'

1616
( 451)
12729
(2449)
423
156
2180
(1.754)
20975
(2740)
166
710
.176
2,451
463
315
309
341
287
228
185
168
155

077
( 003)
558
( 016)

.012
(.857)
[- 61, .69]
- 010
( 840)
[- 54, 61]
010
( 976)
[-.65, 77]

140
( 006)

000
(1 541)
[- 91, 1.16]

184
( 012)

395
( 012)
685
( 017)

065
( 007)
119
( 008)

parentheses 10 col

Standard

errors are reported In parentheses m col 2
>I< CoeffiCIent from regressIOn on mtercept and time trend
The time trend
IS

defined as zero

t

In

1979

Actual year equIvalents of labor market experIence, constructed from weeks

and hours worked
survey 10 1979

In

each year, and labor market history pnor

to

the first

:{: Residuals from regressions of normalized tcst scores on mdividual year

age dummy vanables Lower and upper quartlles are reponed 10 square brackets

§ Average of residuals for tests of anthmetH.., mathematIcs, word knowledge,
paragraph comprehensIOn, and general SCIence

II Average of residuals for tests of auto and shop knowledge, electronics,
and mechanical knowledge

move through the 1979-87 period. The wage variable we use is a measure
of hourly earnings (in current dollars) on the primary Job held at the time
of the interview; the trend coefficient shows that this wage has increased
by almost 8% per year over the 1979-87 penod. While part of this increase
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is due to Inflation, the increase also reflects the fact that individuals in the
later years have a higher average level of education, have more experience
at the time of the first postschooling job observation, and are older at the
time of the first job. Wages in the later years may also be higher because
returns to education (and experience) increased over the period.
Table 1 also reports sample statistics for averages of three subsets of the
ASVAB test scores. Since the respondents were of different ages when the
tests were administered, age effects were removed from the scores by regressing each of the indiVIdual (normalized) test scores on a set of individual-year age dummies (for all observations on white males for whom
the test scores were available). The residuals from selected tests were then
averaged to form the three composite test scores identified in table 1. FollOWing Bishop (1991), we dropped the coding speed test and classified
the remaining tests as either academic, technical, or computational; details
of this classification are provided in the footnotes to the table. Because our
wage-equation estimates suggest that the technical and computational
composites have very SImilar effects on wages, we also present sample
statistics for the sum of these two composItes (the "nonacademIc" test).
The trend coefficients for the test scores show that all three composites
tend to be hIgher for those indIviduals whose first jobs were in the later
years, with the increase over time largest for the academic test and smallest
for the technical test.
B. Wage Equation Estimates
Using our hourly wage variable, we initially estimate equatlOns of the
form

where w is the log wage, S is years of schooling, T IS the value of the time
trend for the year from which the observation is taken, X is a vector of
other factors that affect the wage, Y is a set of year dummies, and E is an
error term. The trend has a value of zero for the first year (1979) and
increases by one for each subsequent year. Including year dummies
effectively controls for variation in wages due to inflation, productivity
growth, or other cyclIcal factors. The other variables Included In X are
experience, age, a union membership dummy, a marriage dummy, and an
urban dummy.12
12 The ordInary least squares (OLS) estimates of trends In the coeffiCients of the
marnage dummy and the urban dummy were near zero and statistically inSIgnificant,
so in our reported estimates we constrained these trends to be zero. In contrast,
the estimated trends In the coeffiCients for age and union membership were statIstIcally SIgnificant and negatIve, and the estimated trend in experience was positive
and nearly statIstIcally significant. Interactions of these variables with a time trend
are Included In all specifications.
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Ordinary least-squares estimates of 131 and 132 in equation (2) are reported
in column 1 of table 2. The results replicate the increased return to schooling
in this period found in other data sets. 13 The estimates suggest that the
linear return to schooling was .032 in 1979 and that this coefficient has
increased by .0034 in each follOWing year; by 1987, the estimate for the
return to schooling is .059. This estimate for the Increase In the return to
schooling is somewhat larger than estimates suggested by previous studies,
though other studies have used samples of workers who are older and
more established than the workers in our sample.
To further explore the robustness of the Increased return to schooling
in the NLSY, in the remaining columns of table 2 we include other education-related variables as regressors to pick up nonlinear effects, while
continuing to interact the years-of-education variable with a time trend.
The linear specification could lead to incorrect inferences concerning the
sign or magnitude of the increase In the return to schooling if the true
relationship between schooling and log wages is nonlinear. This is potentially a serious problem in analyzing our sample since the individuals whose
first jobs are from the earlier years tend to be less educated than the individuals from the later years. For example, if the return were higher for
college than for high-school years of education, our finding that the return
to schooling is higher in the later years studied could entirely be due to
the fact that individuals from the later years have more years of college
education.
In column 2 of table 2, we add years of college as an additional regressor;
the estimates suggest the return to college years is higher than to precollege
years, but including thiS variable only marginally reduces the education/
trend coefficient estimate. Including years of high school along with years
of college (col. 3) reduces the education/trend coefficient estimate more
and provides a statistically Significant negative coeffiCient for high-school
years, relative to pre-high school years of education. In column 4 we
include a college graduate dummy, and in column 5 we include both a
high-school graduate and a college graduate dummy; estimates of both
specifications continue to provide eVidence of an increased return to
schooling. In sum, nonlinear effects of schooling on log wages, combined
with the nature of our sample, may explain some of the large increase in
the return to schooling suggested in column 1, but even after controlling
for these effects, we continue to see a reasonably large rise in the schooling
coefficient.
IJ We also estImated separate wage equatIOns for each year, USIng our sample of
first labor-market observatIons. The schoolIng coeffiCIent estImates are reported in
App. table Al. These coefficients trend upward only approximately. However, we
use the trend InteractIon to parametenze the model tIghtly, which IS particularly
Important for the Instrumental variable (IV) estImation that follows. Also, thiS
parallels specificatIons In related research (Bishop 1991)
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Table 2
OLS Log Wage Equation Estimates

Years of education
Years of education

X

trend

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

.032
(.007)
.0034
( 0017)

.029
(.008)
0030
( 0017)

054
( 014)
.0018
( 0018)
-013
( 006)
.001
( 002)

028
(.008)
.0027
(.0017)

Years of high school
Years of college

002
(.002)

High school graduate
College graduate

iP

080
( 024)
393

393

394

.396

(5)
030
(.008)
0023
( 0018)

- 011
( 017)
.075
(.025)
396

NOTE -Specdicallons also mclude expenence, age, and umon status (each mteracted with a lIme trend
defined as zero m 1979), dummy vanables for urban residence and mamed, spouse present, and an mtercept
and smgle-year dummy van abIes Standard errors are reported m parentheses OLS ~ ordmary least
squares

As discussed in Section II, all of the schooling coefficient estimates in
table 2, and in particular the education/trend coefficient estimate, potentially suffer from biases resulting from the error term being partly composed
of individual abilities not captured in X and from changes in the correlations
between these abilities and schooling. In table 3, we attempt to provide
some idea of the importance of omitted-abilIty bias by including our test
score measures as proxies for this omitted ability. In column 1, we include
the individual's academic, technical, and computational test scores as independent variables. As the coefficient estimates for the technical and
computational tests are very close, and the coeffiCient estimate for the
academic test is negative and statistically insignificant, we estimated a
specification that excludes the academic test and includes the sum of the
technical and computational tests; these results are in column 2. Both
regressIOns provide highly significant coefficient estimates for the nonacademiC test scores, and inclusion of the test scores reduces the estimates
for the schooling coefficient at any point in time (e.g., in col. 1 the coefficient estimate for 1979 is .013 and for 1987 it is .051). However, the
magnitude of the estimated increase in the schooling coefficient does not
decline after including the test scores, but rather increases by nearly a third
(.0048 in table 3, cols. 1 and 2, vs .. 0034 in table 2, col. 1) .14
14 This result is due to the fact that, in our data set, the partial regreSSIOn coefficient
In the aUXiliary regression of ability on schooling displays a statistically slgmficant
negative trend for the test scores that we use. SpeCifically, we regressed the test
scores on all of the vanables Included In the wage equation, including the educatlon/
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Table 3
OLS and IV Log Wage Equation Estimates, Including Test Scores with Constant Coefficients
OLS
0
0

"0

::;

6·
;::!:
@
N
0

~

~
;0

Years of educatIOn
Years of educatlon X trend
AcademIC test
Techmcal test

6·

::r

Cii

ComputatIOnal test

;0
CD

CJ)

c.

Measurement error/
endogeneJty tests.
p-value*

IV for Schooling

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

013
(.008)
0048
(.0017)
- 010
( 017)
044
( 013)
.041
( 010)

012
( 008)
0048
( 0017)

- 000
( 013)
0062
( 0023)
-.057
( 152)

- 001
( 013)
0057
( 0018)

029
( 045)
0077
( 0047)
-.110
( 155)

022
(.043)
0062
(.0042)

028
(.021)
0084
(.0029)
- 042
( 024)

024
( 018)
0070
( 0030)

038
(.006)

094
( 081)

064
( 020)

083
( 081)

035
( 044)

042
( 008)

028
( 009)

331

170

493

418

096

136

NonacademIC test

IF

IV for Test Scores
and SchoolIng

(I)

CD

:<CD

IV for Test Scores

404

405

NOTE -SpeUfilatiOm also Include expenence, age, and umon statm (each Interacted with a time trend defined a, zero In 1979), dummy vanables for urban residence and
marned, spome present, and an Intercept and 'Ingle-vear dummy van able, Standard error, are reported In parenthe,e, imtrumental vanables are IlSled In App table A3 OLS
= ordmary lea~t squares, IV = IJ}'itrumcntal vanable estlmatIon
_

* p-valuc from F-tc<,:,t of <;Igmh<...ancc of coeffluents of residuab from hr<,:,t-stage Instrumental varIable',:,

rcgre~"'lOn',:"

In

log wage equatIOn e~tImated with OLS
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Simply Illcludlllg the test scores as regressors may not be the best way
to use the information III these variables to control for "ability." It seems
reasonable to expect that the productive ability that employers value is at
least partly reflected in our test scores but that several other factors also
affect the outcome of the tests (e.g., test-taking abilIty, sleep the previous
mght, etc.). We might write this process as
TS,

=

yA,

+ v,,

where TS is the test score, A is ability rewarded in the labor market, and
v is other factors that affect the test score. If we assume that A and v are
uncorrelated, we have the claSSical errors-in-variables setup, suggestlllg
that table 3's OLS estimates of the test score coefficients, and coefficients
for variables correlated with the test scores, are Illconsistent. As a remedy,
we assume that ability IS correlated with the family background of the
Illdividual through the equation

A,

=

AF, + 11, ,

where F is a vector of family-background variables. Instrumental variable
estimation of the wage equation when the test score is included as a regressor, using F as an instrument for TS, should elimlllate the inconsistency
in the wage-equation estimates resulting from measurement error in the
test scores. 15
Schooling and test-score coefficient estimates from estimations in which
the test scores are treated as error-ridden are presented III columns 3 and
4 of table 3. The family-background variables used as instruments are lIsted
III the Appendix table A3, along with the coefficient estimates III the firststage regressions for the test scores. 16 The wage-equation estimates show
trend variable For the academIC test, the coefficient estImate (standard error) of
this trend variable was -.010 (.003), whIle for the nonacademic test it was -.036
(.006). We also looked at changes in the abIlity-schooling relationship on a yearby-year baSIS, by regressing the test scores on education and the other varIables
Included In the wage regressIon (omitting, In thIS case, the trend Interactions); the
schooling coefficient estimates from the regressions for academIC and nonacademIc
test scores are reported in App. table A2.
15 We assume that F and lJ are uncorrelated. Prior research suggests that it IS
reasonable to exclude famIly-background varIables as regressors In a wage equation
(see the dIscussion In Blackburn and N eumark [1992]). This method for controlling
for unobserved abIlIty was originally suggested by Gnhches and Mason (1972);
see also the surveys In Gnhches (1977, 1979).
16 For observatIons In whIch a famIly-background varIable IS miSSing, we set the
variable to zero; we also include dummy vanables for each family-background
variable being mIssing. This IS essentIally a first-order regressIOn method for handling
mISSIng regressors. ThIS method IS likely to proVIde inconSIstent coefficient estimates
(see Kmenta 1986), so the coefficient estimates we report in App. table A3 are
hkely biased estImates of A. However, the inconSIstency in these estImates should
not affect the consIstency of our estImates of the wage equatIon.
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the estimate of the "ability" effect to be larger than without instrumenting,
as would usually be expected if the OLS coefficients suffered from measurement-error bias. The schooling coefficients also decline, for any given
year, and appear to be essentially zero in the earliest years. But the Increase
in the return to schooling is slightly larger as a result of instrumenting for
the test scores, again suggesting that omitted ability plays no role in explaining increases in the return to schooling. We also performed specification tests (suggested by Hausman [1978]) for the presence of measurement-error bias in the ability coefficient; the probability values for the null
hypothesis of no measurement-error bias are also reported in table 3. The
specification tests do not provide strong evidence against the hypothesis
that test scores are uncorrelated with the wage equation errors.
Our IV estimates may also be inconsistent if the level of schooling IS
not exogenous with respect to the postschooling wage. Models in which
schooling decisions depend on the wage (e.g., human-capital models in
which wages represent opportunity costs of schooling), or measurement
error In the schooling variable (Griliches and Mason 1972), suggest that
schooling may be correlated with the wage-equation error. Given the young
age of the men in our sample, endogeneity is a potentially serious problem
since the wages we observe are likely highly correlated with those relevant
to their schooling decisions. To explore this possibility, we use our familybackground variables to instrument for both test scores and education;
these results are reported in columns 5 and 6 of table 3. 17 This technique
does affect the point estimates for the schooling and ability coefficients,
but it also leads to a considerable increase in the standard errors aSSOCiated
with these coefficients. Most importantly, the Increase in the return to
schooling implied by the point estimates is even larger. Finally, if we instrument for schooling but not the test scores (cols. 7 and 8), we find
pOint estimates for the test scores similar to those in columns 5 and 6; the
estimated increase in the return to schooling is larger still and remains
statistically significant. Hausman tests generally do not provide strong
evidence against the joint hypotheSIS that both test scores and schooling
are uncorrelated with the wage error term. However, the evidence against
exogeneity is stronger when schooling is conSidered alone, with p-values
of .096 (using both test scores) and .136 (using only the nonacademic
test score).
17 Rather than instrumentmg for the education/trend mteraction, we used the
first-stage predicted value for education and mteracted It With the trend vanable
m forming instruments since there IS no reason to expect the trend vanable to be
correlated with the error term. This IS the method of ''internal mstruments" (Bowden
and Turkmgton 1984). USing standard IV techniques (I.e., forming the interactions
and then Instrumenting) yielded qualitatively Similar coefficient estimates, but
standard errors that were often three or four times as large as those In table 3; this
latter findmg parallels results in Bowden and Turkmgton
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We were concerned that our results may be partially driven by the failure
to adequately control for interactive effects among the determinants of the
wage. For instance, there may be an mteraction between education and
ability in wage equations; in particular, education may have a larger impact
on the wages of more able workers. This may be particularly important
given that, in our sample, individuals observed in the later years have both
higher test scores and more schooling.
The first column of table 4 presents estimates for the speCification in
the second column of table 3 with an interaction between schooling and
nonacademic ability as a regressor. 18 The estimated coefficient of the educatIon/nonacademic test interaction is pOSitive and statistically significant
and the education/trend coefficient estimate is reduced considerably. This
result suggests that our findmg of an increase m the return to schooling
may be partly due to a combination of an ability/education interactIve
effect and the fact that average levels of ability are increasing over time in
our sample. However, the estimates in columns 2 and 3 suggest that this
interactive effect IS much less important if we allow the education/nonacademic test coefficient to vary over time and also add mteractIons of the
nonacademic test score with age, experience and a trend. 19 For example,
in column 3, the education coefficient estimate still displays an upward
(although statistically insignificant) trend, though there IS also some (slight)
eVidence that the education/nonacademic test coefficient is increasing
over tIme.
It IS not surprising that there is little evidence of an interactive effect of
educatIon and nonacademic ability since there is no clear reason why nonacademic ability would be expected to increase the beneficial effects of
educatIOn. In columns 4-6 of table 4, we repeat the estimations of columns
1-3 usmg the academic test score in place of the nonacademic. Including
an lllteraction between the academic test and education provides a signifICant coefficient estimate for the lllteraction and leaves the estimated increase in the schooling coefficient at essentially zero. This interactive effect
of academic ability and schooling appears to be present primarily in the
18 We estImated these specificatIons by OLS uSing the test scores as ability measures. Strictly speaking, thiS method of estImatIon IS supported by the Insigmficant
Hausman test statIstics of table 3. USing different data, Blackburn and Neumark
(1992) found that instrumenting was necessary when using an IQ test score, the
difference In findings may be due to the ASVAB test scores being less error-prone
than the IQ test scores in the other data. Below, however, we report results treating
the test scores and schooling as correlated WIth the wage equatIon error
19 To ease the Interpretation of the coeffiCients, we have defined the levels of
educatIon, expenence, and age used In the interaction varIables as deviations from
12,2, and 21, respectIvely (nearthe sample means) Thus, e.g, In col. 3 the Implied
partIal denvative of log wages with respect to the nonacademiC test score, for an
individual with 12 years of schooling, 2 years of experIence, and aged 21, IS Simply
the coeffiCient on the test score (.052).
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Table 4
OLS Log Wage Equation Estimates, Alternative Trend and Interactive
Specifications

Years of
educatIOn
Years of
educatIOn
X trend
NonacademIC
test
NonacademIc
test X years
of educatIOn

(I)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

026
( 009)

025
(.009)

019
( 009)

031
( 009)

.029
( 009)

025
( 009)

.025
( 009)

.023
( 009)

-.0003
(.0020)

- 0001
( 0021)

- 0003
( 0021)

0004
( 0020)
061
( 012)

0015
0015
( 0018) (.0018)

0022
0001
( 0019) ( 0019)

.038
(.006)

036
( 006)

052
( 009)

067
( 016)

009
( 002)

006
( 003)

.002
( 004)

005
( 007)

.0008
( 0008)

0010
( 0008)

-.0005
(.0015)

-.0041
( 0028)

- 0057
( 0050)

- 005
( 004)

- 002
( 006)

010
( 003)

006
(.005)

006
( 003)
- 021
(.017)

NonacademIc
test X years
of education
X trend
NonacademIc
test X trend
NonacademIc
test
X expenence
NonacademIc
test X age
AcademIc test
AcademIC test
X years of
educatIOn

048
( 011)

043
( 012)

.058
(.020)

- 043
(.032)

015
( 004)

005
(.007)

- 003
( 007)

- 004
(.014)

AcademIc test
X years of
educatIOn
X trend

0029
( 0014)

AcademIC test
X trend
AcademIC test
X expenence
AcademIc test
X age

R'

409

409

411

402

0032
( 0015)

0034
( 0028)

- 0022
( 0054)

0068
( 0094)

-.0037
(.0027)

0029
(.0010)

-.012
(.007)

- 007
( 011)

019
( 005)

009
( 009)

009
( 007)

405

413

414

403

NOTe -SpccdicatlOns also mdudc experIence, age, and unton status (each Interacted WIth a time trend
defined as zero In 1979), dummh' van abies for urban reSIdence and marned, spou~e present, and an intercept,
and smgle-year dummy vana les Standard errors are reponed In parentheses OLS = ordmary least
square~

Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.

537

Return to SchoolIng

later years of our sample, as the estimate of the test-score/education/
trend coefficient is positive and statistically sigmficant in columns 5 and
6. 20 If we include all interactions for both the academic and nonacademic
test scores in the same equation (col. 7), the academic test/educatlon/
trend coefficient estimate is still large but becomes statistically inSignificant
because of a much higher standard error. In column 8, we exclude all
variables with clearly insignificant coefficient estimates, leaving the academic test/education/trend coefficient estimate virtually unchanged but
with a much smaller standard error. While any hypothesis testing associated
with column 8 does suffer from pretest bias, the t-statistic of 2.9 is rather
large. In addition, in both columns 7 and 8, an estimated increase In the
coefficient on education is no longer present.
Finally, the estimates reported in table 4 also contain some information
on changes in the "price" of ability. As we noted earlier, increases in the
price of abilIty, as well as a strengthened partial correlation between ability
and schooling, could have generated increases in returns to schooling over
the 1980s. The point estimates in column 8 of table 4 suggest that, if
anything, the coefficient for the nonacademic test has been declining. The
positive coeffiCient for the academic test/education/trend interaction is
consistent with an increase in the return to abilIty for the more highly
educated. However, there is no evidence of an across-the-board Increase
in the price of academic ability; the coefficient estimates of the academic
test/trend interaction In columns 6 and 7 are statistically Insignificant.
Estimates of the coefficients Involving test-score / trend interactions may
be biased toward zero. Because the NLSY respondents took the ASVAB
tests in 1979 and 1980, It is possible that the test scores are more accurate
indicators of abilIty for observations close to these years and nOisier indicators for observations later in the sample period. This increase in measurement error over the sample period could bias the results against finding
an Increase In the "price" of ability. To shed some lIght on thiS problem,
for each of the two test scores we estimated the wage equation specification
from table 2, column 1, adding the test score and the test-score/trend
interaction. We estimated these specifications first using OLS, and then
instrumenting for the test-score variables. If the test scores for the later
observations are more error-ridden, then the IV estimation should remove
the bias In the estimates of the test-score/trend coefficients and result In
higher point estimates than the OLS estimation (when the latter are positive). However, for both the nonacademic and academic test scores, the
20 Krueger (1991) finds that the Increase in the return to schoolmg between 1984
and 1989 was larger for individuals reporting use of a computer at work. SInce It
seems plausible that these individuals have relatively high academiC ability, this
result IS consistent With our findIng of a positive coeffiCient for the test-score /
education trend.
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IV estimate of the coefficient of the test-score/trend interactIon IS lower
than the OLS estimate. 21 Thus, we do not belIeve that this source of measurement-error bias IS a serious problem.
To summarize the findings from tables 3 and 4, the increase in the return
to education over the 1980s persists when account is taken of the potential
relationships between ability, schooling and wages. However, our investigation leads to a refinement of the finding: the increase in the return to
education occurred for workers with relatively high academic ability. In
fact, because the test scores are constructed to have means near zero, the
estimates imply that most workers with below average academic ability
experienced a decline in the return to schooling. 22 Overall, then, existing
estimates of the Increase in the return to schooling, from data sets without
ability measures, overstate the relative wage gaInS that educatIOn would
have imparted to a randomly chosen (or marginal) worker.
C. Robustness Checks
Several checks of the robustness of our findIngs are reported in table 5.

In each case, the first two columns report the OLS estimate of the education
coeffiCIent and its trend in specifications without ability controls. The next
two columns report these coefficients' estimates from speCifications that
Include the test-score interactions included in column 8 of table 4. We also
report the academic test/education/trend coefficient estimate, and the
estimate for the coefficient on the nonacademic test score.
First, we conSider the effects of changes in the sample used in estimating
the wage equations. We tried two alternative restrictions in selecting the
sample. FIrSt, we excluded any individual with labor market experience
greater than 3 years, to aVOId using Individuals who may be firmly ensconced in the labor force and therefore not competing for a new Job and
to reduce the potential confounding influence of learning or signaling.
Second, we excluded observations whose first postschooling Jobs were in
1982 or 1983, to enhance the comparison between the low-schooling-return
and high-schooling-return periods and to eliminate severe recession years.
21 For the nonacademiC test, the OLS estimate (standard error) of the test-score I
trend Interaction was .0033 ( 0023), and the IV estimate was 0024 (.0077); for the
academic test the corresponding estimates were .0097 (.0046), and -.0157 (.0175).
Instrumental variable estimates of the speCification In col. 8 of table 4 (InstrumentIng
for the test-score van abies but not schooling) also suggest that instrumentIng for
the test scores reduces (if anything) the estimated change In the return to abtllty
(for a worker with the average level of education)
22 For example, consider a worker With an academIC test score 1 standard deviation
(.857) below the mean (.012), usmg the estimates in col. 8. The annual change m the
return to schooling for thiS worker IS .0004 + .0029·(- 845) = -.0021 Smce, on
average, more schoohng IS associated With higher test scores, thiS IS not mconslstent
With mcreased returns to schoolmg m wage regressions omittIng abihty measures
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Table 5
Schooling and Schooling X Abilit~ Coefficients and Trend Interactions
for Alternative Samples and SpeCifications

Years-of-Educatlon Coefficients

OLS estlmates
Results from earher
tables
Maximum experience
of 3 years
(N = 1,888)
1982 and 1983
excluded
(N = 1,823)
College graduatlon
dummy variable
Included
One-digit Industry
dummy variables
Included
(N = 2,297)
One-digit occu~atlOn
dummy varia les
Included
(N = 2,297)
One-digit Industry and
oecubatlOn dummy
varia les Included
(N = 2,297)
IV estlmates.
IV for test scores
IV for test scores and
schoohng
IV for schoohng
NOTE

Years of
EducatIOn
X Academic
Test
Nonacademic
X Trend
Test Score
Coefficient
CoeffiCIent
Table 4,
Col 8
Trend

Table 4,
Col. 8
Linear

0004
( 0020)

0029
( 0010)

061
( 012)

.027
(.009)

0008
( 0024)

0045
( 0012)

064
(.012)

0036
( 0017)

018
( 009)

0009
(.002 I)

.0026
(001 I)

058
( 013)

028
( 008)

0027
( 0017)

018
( 009)

- 0001
( 0020)

0030
( 0010)

064
(.012)

038
( 007)

0033
(.0016)

028
( 009)

0009
( 0019)

0023
( 0010)

052
( 012)

029
( 008)

0013
(.0017)

021
( 009)

- 0014
( 0018)

.0017
(.0010)

.045
( 012)

032
( 007)

0016
( 0016)

022
( 008)

0003
( 0019)

0014
( 0010)

047
( 011)

- 001
( 019)

0047
( 0043)

- 0005
( 0009)

089
( 075)

.035
( 057)
051
( 024)

0039
( 0121)
0020
( 0054)

0018
( 0039)
.0053
( 0020)

105
(.086)
.067
( 014)

Table 2, Col. I

Table 4, Col 8

Linear Trend

Linear

032
( 007)

.0034
(.0017)

023
( 009)

034
( 008)

0041
( 0020)

030
( 008)

Trend

-See foornotes m wrrespondmg tables )-4

Both redefinitions of the sample lead to similar concluslOns as with the
full sample, with the sample with the maximum-experience restriction
prOViding a larger estimated increase in the academic test/education interaction effect than was provided by the full sample.
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Next, we consider alternative wage equation specifications. The fourth
row of table 5 presents results from estimations that include a college
graduation dummy; again, conclusions are essentially unchanged. We also
estimated wage equations that include 12 industry and 11 occupation dummies as regressors; these results are reported in the next three rows of table
5. These estimates suggest that occupatIOnal shifts (but not Industry shifts)
can explain a considerable portion of the schooling return Increase If we
omit ability from the specifications. 23 Occupation (and to a lesser extent
industry) shifts also appear to account for at least part of the increase In
the interactive effect of academic ability and education, suggestIng that at
least part of the increased importance of education to wages for highacademic-ability males is due to demand shifts toward occupations (and
industries) that tend to employ hlgh-education/hlgh-abllity individuals.
Finally, we report estimates of the specification reported in column 8
of table 4, treating the test scores and/or schoolIng as potentially correlated
with the wage equation error. In the two estimations In which we instrument for the test score variables, the prevIOus finding regarding the Increase
in the return to schoolIng-that it occurred only for high-ability workersis not supported, but the POInt estimate of the education/trend coeffiCIent
increases (and is marginally significant when we instrument for test scores
only). However, none of the reported coefficients is statIstically Significant;
the impreclSJon of these estimates IS not surprising, given the number of
variables constructed from fitted values based on the same set of exogenous
varIables. Finally, the last row of the table reports results instrumenting
for schooling only. Based on the evidence from the Hausman tests In table
3, schooling is the variable for which the eVidence agaInst exogeneJty is
strongest. These estimates replicate the OLS estimates in table 4, yielding
a statistically insignificant (and negative) estImate for the education coefficient trend and a statistically significant positive coeffiCIent for the trend
in the academic test score / education Interaction.

IV. Summary
Much attention has been paid to explaining recent increases In the return
to schooling among males in the United States. EstImates of these Increases
are generally obtained from wage regressions that are potentially biased
by the presence of "unobserved" ability In the wage-equatIon error. Both
signaling and human-capital models of educatIonal attaInment suggest that
changes in the relationship between ability and schooling could underlie
increases in the observed return to schooling. We offer evidence on the
23 This findmg differs from that of Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990), who
found that changmg industnal compOSitIOn of employment explams up to 25% of
the mcrease m education-related earnmgs differentials but that occupational changes
played no role m the schoolmg-return mcrease
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plausibility of these explanations, with a particular focus on usmg test
scores as a proxy for ability 10 wage regressions. Our results provide lIttle
or no support in favor of the hypothesIs that the increases 10 the return
to schooling reflect an increased upward bias 10 the schooling coeffiCIent
estimate due to a change in the abIlity-schooling relationship. But our
results do provide an interesting refinement of the stylized fact that education returns have been increasing in the 1980s-the increase in the return
to education has occurred only for workers with relatively high levels of
"academic" ability. This Implies that existing estimates of the increase in
the return to schooling overstate increases in the true incentive for the
margmal individual to acquire schooling.
What can explain an increase 10 the return to education for high-ability
workers only? Supply-side explanations are plausible. For example, if it
were the case that education and ability were becoming less correlated
over time, then there would be relatively fewer of those workers with both
high levels of education and ability; also, if the average level of ability were
to fall, this could create a growing scarCIty of high-education, high-ability
workers. But at present it is difficult to assess the existence or importance
of such supplY-Side changes. 24 While occupatIOn shifts appear to be of
some importance, what is causmg these shifts is still an open question.
Skill-biased technical change is one pOSSibIlity, though the evidence in
favor of thiS argument is stilllimited. 25

Appendix
Table At
Individual-Year Schooling Coefficient
Estimates
Year

CoeffiCIent

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

021
.048
.039
.051
.041
.039
.062
.050
.050

(011)
(011)
(.011)
(.012)
(012)
(013)
(015)
(.015)
(021)

NOTE -Standard errors are reported m parcnthe~e~

24 In fact, Bishop (1991) refers to results that suggest that average test scores of
young IndiViduals started to Increase agaIn after 1980.
25 Krueger (1991) argues that his results are consistent with the technical-change
hypotheSIS. DaVIS and Haltiwanger ( 1991 ) offer eVidence on changes In wage diSpersIOn across manufacturing plants that, they argue, supports the skIll-biased
techmcal-change hypotheSIS. Mincer ( 1991 ) offers time-series eVidence In favor of
the skIll-bias hypothesis

Co
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Table A2
Schooling Coefficient Estimates from
Test-Score Regressions
Year

AcademIC

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

243
275
.291
.278
225
258
246
191
132

NonacademIC

(022)
(021)
(025)
(020)
(023)
(.022)
(.024)
(020)
(027)

513
503
476
401
342
347
356
249
183

(046)
(045)
(054)
(042)
(043)
(044)
(045)
(.038)
(050)

NOTE -Standard errors are reported In parentheses

Table A3
Coefficients of Instrumental Variables in First-Stage Regressions

Magazines

In

home (age 14)

Newspapers

In

home (age 14)

Library card

In

home (age 14)

Father's education (1979)
Mother's education (\ 979)
Number of siblings (1979)
Number of older siblings (\ 979)
Highest grade of oldest sibling
(\979)
Foreign language spoken
(age 14)
Father and mother
No adult male

R'

In

In

In

Nonacademic Test'
(I)

AcademIC Test'
(2)

Schooling
(3)

.231
(.060)
311
( 077)
067
( 061)
029
( 010)
072
( 013)
- 047
( 019)
015
( 024)

149
( 030)
108
( 038)
076
( 030)
015
( 005)
036
( 006)
- 037
( 010)
015
( 012)

484
( 073)
152
( 095)
145
( 075)
080
( 012)
.094
( 016)
- 151
( 022)
086
( 029)

029
( 014)

012
( 007)

105
( 017)

.011
( 082)
- 062
( 082)
- 024
( 106)

- 052
( 041)
- 029
( 040)
-021
(.052)

177
( 100)
387
(.100)
187
( 130)

home

home (age 14)

home (age 14)

368

502

625

NOTE -Cocfllucnts are reported for first-stage regreso;;H. lnS usmg lmear "lhoolmg SpeClficatIOns also
Include Intercepts, SIngle-year dummy >anables, all other vanables Included In speCifications of wage
equatIons In table 3, and dummy van abies for each varuhle In the table set equal to one when data were
mISSIng on the Instruments (In which case the vanables were set equal to ?ero) (We distIngUIsh between
the hIghest grade of oldest SIbling miSSIng In the usual sense and ml"Ing because the respondent IS the
oldest SIbling) Standard errors are reported In parentheses
* SpcClfilatIOn mcludes s,-hoolmg and ItS trend mteraltIon

------------------
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